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ABSTRACT 
Healthcare organizations face significant challenges in designing and implementing the 
appropriate safeguards to mitigate information privacy threats. While many studies examined 
various technical and behavioral safeguards to protect the confidentiality and privacy of patient 
information, very little is known about the actual outcomes and implications of the privacy 
practices in which organizations engage. There is little research theoretically explaining the 
outcomes of enacting privacy safeguards and subsequent effects on privacy compliance. This 
paper reports the results of a grounded theory study investigating the intended consequences 
(positive impacts) and unintended (negative impacts) consequences of enacting privacy 
safeguards in healthcare organizations. An imbalance challenge occurs when the negative 
impacts outweigh the positive ones.  To address the imbalance challenge, organizations need to 
achieve a balance between privacy and utility, meeting privacy requirements without impeding 
the workflow in medical practices. Findings are presented within an emerging theoretical 
framework of the imbalance challenge identified in this work.  This study is one of the first 
systematic attempts to identify the opposing impacts of privacy safeguard enactments and 
examine its implications for privacy compliance in the healthcare domain. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Ensuring patient information privacy remains one of the most pressing problems in the 
modern healthcare industry. Situations where personal health information is stolen or disclosed 
without authorization have been widely discussed in the media and have raised awareness about 
digitization and the use of personal health information. For example, the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse has been tracking breaches since 2005 and published a chronology including over 
22 million healthcare-related breaches (PRC 2012). Since 2009, the Office of Civil Rights has 
identified privacy breaches affecting over 19 million individuals (HHS 2011a). Information 
privacy breaches endanger the privacy and confidentiality of patient information (Angst and 
Agarwal 2009; Bourgeois et al. 2008; Fernando and Dawson 2009), resulting in problems such 
as adverse effects on medical insurance and unemployment (Benitez and Malin 2010). In 
addition, these breaches may also affect organizations’ reputations and lead to dire consequences 
such as monetary penalties and civil and criminal liabilities (Bulgurcu et al. 2010).  
Previous research advocated implementing privacy safeguards in organizational privacy 
management,
1
 i.e., preventative measures to reduce privacy threats and protect sensitive health 
information, such as policies, privacy-enhancing technologies, and administrative processes, 
(Aberdeen et al. 2010; Agrawal and Johnson 2007; Croll 2010; Culnan and Williams 2009; 
Mohan and Razali Raja Yaacob 2004). These safeguards do not seem effective, because privacy 
breaches continue to occur (Culnan and Williams 2009). Empirical evidence suggests that 
                                                           
1
 In this research, we focus on privacy management problems resulting from as organizational information practices 
in terms of collection, use, security, and distribution of personal information (Culnan and Williams 2009). 
Consistent with Culnan and Williams (2009), we define security as one aspect of privacy and argue that privacy 
includes more than security. According to Culnan and Williams (2009, p.675), “privacy is broader and encompasses 
permission and use of personal information. Privacy is difficult to achieve without security. However, organizations 
can successfully secure the personal information in their databases but still make bad decisions about subsequent use 
and distribution of personal information, resulting in a privacy problem.” 
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effective privacy safeguards should account for business impact (Choi et al. 2006; Parks et al. 
2011b; Stahl et al. 2011). However, very little is known about the impacts of privacy safeguard 
enactments on clinicians’ needs for information and organizational workflow. Moreover, there is 
little research theoretically explaining the outcomes of enacting privacy safeguards and the 
subsequent effects on privacy compliance.
2
 As Belanger and Crossler (2011, p. 1022) pointed out, 
“there are many behavioral questions to be explored with respect to not only use of potential 
privacy protection tools but also effectiveness and consequences of use.” Similarly, this void in 
extant privacy literature has also been identified by an interdisciplinary literature review (Smith 
et al. 2011) that highlights the need for more privacy research to consider actual outcomes. 
Following these calls for research on examining  impacts and outcomes of privacy safeguards, 
we aim to investigate the conditions under which the negative impacts
3
 of privacy safeguard 
enactments outweigh the positive ones (i.e., the imbalance challenge occurs). Specifically, we 
aim to address the following two research questions in this work:  
Research Question 1: What are the positive and negative business impacts in implementing 
information privacy safeguards, and how are these safeguards integrated into medical practices? 
Research Question 2: Under what conditions will the negative impacts of privacy safeguard 
enactments outweigh the positive ones? What are the outcomes of the imbalance challenge? 
The current study contributes to existing privacy research in several important ways. First, 
following the call by Belanger and Crossler (2011), we have studied the outcome of enacting 
privacy safeguards and their subsequent effects on privacy compliance; specifically, the 
                                                           
2
 Privacy compliance is defined as complying with HIPPA privacy rules in order to assure the confidentiality of 
electronically protected health information.   
3
 In this study, the term “impact” is used to describe the challenges organizational leaders identified from their 
operational processes and work practices after the enactment of privacy safeguards. 
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imbalance challenge emerged as an analytical construct to capture unintended consequences 
caused by the situation where the negative impacts of privacy safeguards outweigh the positive 
ones. Second, Smith et al. (2011) have shown a lack of organizational level privacy research in 
extant literature, and the challenge is that studies at the organizational levels “are necessarily 
more complex and less conducive to ‘quick’ data collection techniques such as written and 
online surveys” (p. 1006). This research provides new theoretical insights into understanding 
privacy management by targeting this under-researched level of analysis through a grounded 
theory approach. Third, this study was designed to gain an in-depth understanding of the actual 
outcomes and implications of privacy practices in healthcare organizations. Therefore, using a 
grounded theory methodology provides a rich lens to understand the consequences of privacy 
safeguards enactments and their implications for privacy compliance. Fourth, this study 
contributes to the recent need for interdisciplinary research by converging the research streams 
of IS and health informatics. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We review literature from both the fields of IS and health informatics in order to describe 
the current level of knowledge associated with the impacts in implementing information privacy 
safeguards. The literature in health informatics was sought because this study focuses on 
healthcare organizations. Following this review, we briefly outline the different types of 
information privacy safeguards, identify the gaps in literature, and then discuss how negative 
impacts of enacting privacy safeguards contribute to the imbalance challenge. 
There is a growing, yet limited, body of research targeting organizational responses to 
privacy threats and issues (Culnan and Williams 2009; Greenaway and Chan 2005, Smith et al. 
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2011). One recent study suggests that organizations respond to the increasing list of privacy 
threats through a combination of technical and human controls, as well as processes (Parks et al. 
2011a). In terms of technical safeguards, health informatics literature is saturated with research 
that employs various technologies to address health information privacy threats, including the 
application of access control mechanisms to limit access to authorized users (Blobel et al. 2006; 
Chen et al. 2010; Lovis et al. 2007; Mohan and Razali Raja Yaacob 2004; Peleg et al. 2008; Reni 
et al. 2004; Sujansky et al. 2010; van der Linden et al. 2009), use of anonymization and 
pseudonymization to remove the identifier from medical data (Aberdeen et al. 2010; Boyd et al. 
2007; Chiang et al. 2003; Li and Sarkar 2010; Mohan and Razali Raja Yaacob 2004; Neubauer 
and Heurix 2011; Ohno-Machado et al. 2004; Quantin et al. 2000),  and adoption of encryption 
and cryptographic methods to make the data unreadable to anyone except those who hold the 
keys (Kluge 2007; Quantin et al. 2000).  
One of the biggest challenges in implementing the aforementioned technical safeguards is 
to develop systems or technologies that do not impede the operational activities of healthcare 
providers (Lovis et al. 2007).  In terms of healthcare delivery processes, both IS and health 
informatics research discuss policies that were developed to govern such processes and ensure 
information privacy. It has been almost two decades since Smith (1993) published the findings 
based on a study of organizational privacy policies, which drew attention to such problems as a 
lack of policies and gaps between different policies and practices. While organizations in the U.S. 
are more likely to have a privacy policy (Liu and Arnett 2002; Peslak 2006), the gap between 
policies and clinical uses is still significant (Croll 2010), and research on policy violations is 
growing (Siponen and Vance 2010). In term of human safeguards, several studies investigated 
the impact of training and education and thus contributed to the current scholarly knowledge 
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(D'Arcy et al. 2009; Fernando and Dawson 2009; Ishikawa 2000; Mohan and Razali Raja 
Yaacob 2004; Patel et al. 2000; Yeh and Chang 2007). The positive impact of these safeguards is 
questionable, especially with more recent research on employees’ misbehaviors, lack of 
adherence, and compliance problems (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Siponen and Vance 2010; Vroom 
and Von Solms 2004).  
As discussed above, various types of information privacy safeguards have been identified 
as the mechanisms for organizations to respond to privacy threats and achieve compliance. 
However, establishing safeguards in harmony with the “actual day-to-day procedures” remains 
one of the major challenges for healthcare organizations (Choi et al. 2006). In this study, we 
identified four facets of negative impacts on enacting information privacy safeguards: (1) 
unavailability of information, (2) workflow disruptions, (3) usability issues, and (4) operational 
feasibility issues.  
Unavailability of Information. Healthcare professionals, such as doctors and nurses, are 
increasingly dependent on the availability and accuracy of patient information to provide 
adequate treatment and make other healthcare-related decisions. Information availability is very 
important in the healthcare sector, where it is often needed on a continuous, 24/7 basis. 
Traditionally, non-availability of information is linked with computer failures, program or 
human errors, and environmental conditions (Bakker 1998). However, existing privacy research 
in the field of health informatics highlights the dilemma of ensuring availability and access to 
patient information for authorized healthcare providers without breaching the confidentiality and 
privacy of medical information (Salomon et al. 2010; Smith and Eloff 1999). If the information 
needed by healthcare professionals to reach critical clinical decisions was unavailable due to 
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tight access controls, patients may be incorrectly treated. Therefore, unavailability of information 
may have dire consequences for the quality for patient care. 
Workflow Disruptions. In the pursuit of privacy compliance, organizations implement 
processes that change their operational workflows. These changes may involve encrypting 
documents network transmission, pulling staff out for training, or instating time-out features. As 
a result, users may not always positively react to implemented changes, especially when these 
changes disrupt their work routines. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) reported push backs and resistance 
from users. According to Choi (2006), before HIPAA, workflow was much smoother and more 
efficient than the newer workflow that involves locking doors and limiting computer access to 
avoid regulatory incompliance and/or penalties. Another example of how implementing privacy 
safeguards triggers workflow disruptions is documented by Coiera et al. (2004), in which 
managing patients’ e-consent privacy preferences may impede clinicians’ workflow. Failure to 
address these workflow disruptions could potentially lead employees to embrace workarounds to 
bypass features that make accomplishing their work difficult (Ash et al. 2004). 
Usability Issues. Usability has been defined as the degree of efficiency and effectiveness 
of use (Bennett 1984; Shackel 1984), and this concept has been applied within a range of users, 
tasks, tools, and environments. With the design and implementation of privacy protective 
technologies, usability has become an extremely important, albeit poorly understood, element of 
privacy. The end results are user dissatisfaction and unusable systems (Johnson et al. 2005). In 
the healthcare industry, understanding the interplay between usability and privacy is essential. 
Privacy safeguard technologies, such as biometrics, have been introduced to control access to 
medical facilities and protect the privacy and confidentiality of patient information (Marohn 
2006).  However, using biometrics also poses several usability issues due to the impact of 
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temperature, humidity, and dirt (Flores Zuniga et al. 2010). The usability issues of biometrics can 
also stem from the user’s age, skin color, or certain health conditions where the use of hygienic 
gloves is required (Flores Zuniga et al. 2010). This study pertains to the impacts of privacy 
safeguard enactments on workflow and work practices; therefore, we will focus on usability 
issues perceived by healthcare workers. 
Operational Feasibility Issues. Operational feasibility is an important factor for the 
deployment of new technologies or processes in the real world.  Privacy safeguards include a 
variety of measures that range from technologies to policies and processes. In the case of 
technologies, several research papers reported negative impacts of the implementation of 
protective technologies on operational feasibility resulting in the degradation of performance. 
Zhao et al.  (2005), in a technical study on security protocols, found that such security protocols 
led to a tradeoff between privacy measures and performance. Implementing privacy safeguards 
includes putting into place formal privacy education and training programs, as well as 
monitoring compliance through the use of technology and human processes. Prior studies 
investigated the impact of training on employees and their employees’ compliance (Whitman and 
Mattord 2004).  However, there is little insight into how these safeguards impact the operational 
feasibilities of healthcare practices. We are unaware of any studies, other than technology-
oriented ones, analyzing the operational impact of training, audits and investigation, and facility 
access. 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
This study adopts a qualitative research method to answer our research questions about 
the outcomes of enacting privacy safeguards. Specifically, the study uses a qualitative research 
approach based on the grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 2008). Grounded theory aims to 
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develop inductive theory from data through incremental and systematic progression in 
knowledge, deriving conceptual deduction and hypotheses (Urquhart et al. 2010). Furthermore, 
the grounded theory method is particularly appropriate for studies of dynamic environments, 
such as healthcare (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  It offers a rigorous approach that assists in the 
understanding of organizational privacy safeguards at the organizational level, through testable 
theories tightly connected to their data and their context (Eisenhardt 1989).  
3.1 Data Collection 
After clearance of the Institutional Review Board (IRB), informants were contacted to 
participate in this study. Informants from U.S. hospitals as well as other healthcare organizations 
(consulting and healthcare research firms, government, and professional healthcare organizations) 
agreed to participate in this study as part of a dissertation project. All informants held executive 
and decision-making positions within their respective organizations. Table 1 summarizes the 
informants’ titles and types of organizations.  
Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews with thirty key consenting 
informants who could offer expert knowledge in privacy practices and were holding key 
positions in hospitals, such as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Information Officer (CIO), 
Chief Privacy Officer (CPO), Chief Medical Information Officer (CMIO), Information 
Technology directors and privacy officers (Table 1). Interviews lasted between 40 and 90 
minutes and were carried out by the first author between fall 2010 and spring 2012. The 
interviews explored the types of safeguards being used by healthcare organizations to mitigate 
privacy threats and their impacts on healthcare activities and practices. Further details about the 
interview items are provided in Appendix A and B. 
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Hospital size Informants Title 
Small  
(less than 200 beds) 
1 Chief Executive Officer 
2 Privacy Officer 
3 IT Director 
4 Chief Information Officer 
5 IT Director 
6 Vice President 
7 Executive Director  
8 Director of HIM 
9 Privacy Officer 
10 IT Director 
Medium  
(between 200 and 
500 beds) 
11 Chief Information Officer 
12 Chief Privacy Officer 
13 Vice President of IT 
14 Chief Privacy Officer 
15 Security Officer 
16 IS Director 
17 Privacy Officer 
18 Chief Information Officer 
Large  
(more than 500 
beds) 
19 Chief Medical Information Officer 
20 Chief Medical Information Officer 
21 Chief Privacy Officer 
22 Privacy Officer 
23 HIPAA Security Officer 
24 Chief Security Officer 
25 HIPAA Officer 
Other healthcare 
organizations 
26 President 
27 Chief Privacy Officer 
28 Vice President 
29 Chief Privacy Officer 
30 Chief Executive Officer 
Table 1:  Summary of Data Sources 
In grounded theory, sampling is driven by conceptual emergence and limited by 
theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Consequently, the selection of data sources is 
neither a random selection nor a totally a priori determination. For example, we decided a priori 
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that a combination of different hospital sizes was most appropriate for this study; however, the 
specific details depended on the emerging themes. Strauss and Corbin note that the researcher 
must be flexible to handle the turns and twists as they arise during data collection and analysis. 
In this study, theoretical sampling is evident through the following statements: 
• Interviewing was initiated with informants from hospitals. However, after initial data 
analysis, this target was revisited to include other healthcare organizations and entities 
(e.g., the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, healthcare professional 
associations, healthcare IT providers, and healthcare privacy consultants).  
• The interview questions were also revisited after the analysis of the first interviews, in 
order to include more specific questions about the operational impacts as a result of 
implementing privacy safeguards. This is consistent with Strauss and Corbin’s approach 
to theoretical sampling, where the researcher “adjusts the interviews and observations on 
the basis of emergent and relevant concepts” (1998, p. 207). 
 Although we were faced with the difficulty of getting participants because of the critical 
sensitivity of privacy and security topics (Kotulic and Clark, 2004), as well as the scheduling 
challenges of healthcare executives, data collection and analysis were conducted until the point 
of saturation, when redundancy in the data was reached and no new concepts were found (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008).  
3.2 Data Analysis 
 In this section, we provide a summarized overview of the steps undertaken using the 
grounded theory approach. These steps are depicted in Figure 1. 
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All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Transcribed interviews 
were imported to a computer aided qualitative data analysis software tool called Nvivo (v.9). It is 
worth noting that Nvivo is not a software that automatically code the transcribed interviews but 
rather was used to organize the different codes and categories that were identified during the first 
and second order analysis. NVivo supported conducting different stages of analysis including 
setting up concepts within themes called nodes, and providing some data analysis capabilities for 
searching, grouping, and relating nodes. Interviews were coded in several steps. First, we used 
open coding techniques to inductively identify preliminary categories. No a priori coding or 
categorization was used. The next step used was axial coding, which helped to develop the 
categories further into themes (Strauss and Corbin 2008). Finally, we implemented selective 
coding, where we related the categories together into a coherent theoretical framework. During 
the process of data collection and analysis, we reviewed the literature from both the IS and health 
informatics communities to identify potential contributions of our findings to the privacy 
literature in the healthcare context. 
 
 
Data 
Collection
Emergent 
Theoretical 
Model
Analysis Findings
Procedure: 
- 1st& 2nd order 
coding
- Themes   
development
- Literature   
review
Results:
- Coded texts
-Themes
Procedure: 
- Describe    
themes
Results:
- Description of 
themes
Procedure: 
- Linking 
identified 
themes
Results:
- Coherent 
framework
Procedure: 
- Semi-
structured 
interviews
-Workshops
- Documents
Results:
-Transcripts
- Documents
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Figure 1: Grounded Theory Analysis Process  
During the coding process, every piece of data was contrasted against other pieces through 
constant comparison. The process of constant comparison was an iterative one to assure the 
allocation of the appropriate codes to informants’ views. The constant comparison determines 
the relevance or otherwise the assumptions to the emergent theory. For example, the initial 
perception of the importance of the hospital’s size did not sustain into the theory.  
Having embracing constant comparison, we needed to know when to stop coding and 
categorizing data. We continued looking for information until the categories were saturated and 
no additional data was found.  
3.3 Evaluative and Trustworthiness Criteria 
 Every research must be evaluated by the appropriate criteria. Positivist researchers 
employ the criteria of internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity. These 
criteria are not appropriate for interpretive studies. In what follows, two approaches for judging 
interpretive research are presented: (1) ensuring trustworthiness (Lincoln et al. 1985) and (2) 
ensuring the adequacy of the research process and the empirical grounding (Strauss et al., 1998; 
Corbin et al., 2008).  
 The aim of trustworthiness is to support the premise that the study’s findings are “worth 
paying attention to” (Lincoln et al., 1985, p. 290). Lincoln and Guba (1985) offered a set of four 
trustworthiness criteria appropriate for interpretive research and analogous to positivist research: 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. To address credibility, the study 
used multiple methods and sources to ensure triangulation of the findings, such as single 
interviews, group interviews, and data collection across different sources (e.g., hospitals, 
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government, consultants, and IT designers). Triangulation was also achieved by supplementing 
workshops, round tables, and documentation. Moreover, the first author had several years of 
industry experience in healthcare IT, in addition to being an active member of a healthcare 
research center and a national healthcare professional association. To ensure transferability, the 
study provided a detailed first-order analysis of the phenomenon and context, which is supposed 
to provide enough background for the readers to judge the plausibility of the findings and their 
applicability beyond the bounds of this project (Van Maanen 1979).  Rather than conducting an 
inter-rater reliability, an inquiry audit was conducted. This is because interpretive research 
assumes each researcher will have a unique interpretation of the findings, therefore inter-rater 
reliability cannot be applied (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). An inquiry audit was performed by one 
professor of organizational behavior and a senior graduate student (trained in qualitative research) 
to examine and assess the process of inquiry and review the interview transcripts, coding sheets, 
and data analysis.  Finally, to measure how the findings are supported by the data collected; the 
study was shared with professors, two graduate students, and two healthcare professionals, in 
order to get critical feedback. Consensus suggests that this research analysis and theoretical 
model accurately reflect the data. 
 Corbin and Strauss (2008) identified several criteria for evaluating the empirical 
grounding and the research process of the study. Each criterion was evaluated for applicability 
and documented in Appendix F and Appendix G. 
4. FINDINGS 
In this section, findings about positive impacts and negative impacts are reported. 
Negative impacts are identified as information unavailability, disruptions of workflows, usability 
issues, and operational feasibilities issues. Positive impacts are identified as deterrence effects, 
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controlled access, and tracking mechanisms. Figure 2 depicts the first-order concepts that led to 
the second-order themes and overarching dimensions. 
In this study, privacy leaders reported intended consequences (positive impacts) and 
unintended consequences (negative impacts) of implementing privacy safeguards. No concerns 
were noted when there was a dominance of positive impacts. However, the data analysis revealed 
a tension when negative impacts outweighed positive impacts, causing a state of imbalance 
between maintaining patient privacy and not inhibiting work practices. Thus the notion of 
imbalance challenge emerged when the equilibrium between positive and negative impacts is 
shifted because the negative impacts outweigh positive impacts. 
In summary, healthcare organizations face significant challenges in designing and 
implementing the appropriate safeguards to mitigate information privacy threats. These 
challenges continue with the sequel of privacy safeguards post implementation.  For example, 
enacting privacy safeguards such as time out features has a positive impact by protecting 
unattended computers. However, the same feature can stand in the way of optimum healthcare 
delivery for an emergency physician, as noted by a Chief Security Officer: 
“We have twenty minutes time out feature . . .  If I am a doctor in the emergency room 
and my system times out on me while I’m critically working on a patient . . .  I have to  
[enter] my password, that’s not a good thing. “ 
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1
st
 Order 
Concepts 
2
nd
 Order 
Themes 
Aggregate/ 
Overarching 
 Dimensions 
 
 
  
Facilitation of access to legitimate users 
Prohibition of access to those with no “need to 
know” 
  
   
Grisly analogy deterred inappropriate access 
Awareness programs 
  
   
Audit and investigation of access 
Tracking of unauthorized access 
  
   
   
   
Barriers accessing patient information 
Information not accessible when needed 
  
   
Additional privacy features delaying the orderly 
workflows 
Time-out features 
  
   
User unfriendly/not usable 
Employee struggles 
  
   
Inability to encrypt every flash drive 
Cost of time, money and efficiency 
  
   
   
Hospital size 
Academic status of hospitals 
Leadership buy-ins 
Leaders’ educational background 
  
Figure 2: Emergent Concepts, Themes, and Dimensions 
4.1 Negative Impacts   
Throughout this research project, healthcare leaders stated on numerous occasions that 
privacy threats do not end with the implementation of controls. They uniformly emphasized the 
need for better understanding and handling of the conflicting challenges that arose. Hence a 
thorough understanding of these factors and their impacts on business practices is fundamental 
for explaining and possibly addressing the imbalance challenge. One Chief Privacy Officer 
Controlled Access 
Positive 
Impacts 
Deterrence Effect 
Tracking Mechanisms 
Information Unavailability 
Workflow Disruptions 
Negative 
Impacts 
Usability Issues 
Leadership 
Commitment 
Operational Feasibility 
Organizational Context 
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commented: “There is a lot of indirect impact that you have to be careful of its operational 
efficiency . . . It’s got to be costing us money or it’s got to be costing us efficiency.” The impact 
of privacy safeguards brings out a balance issue that is of high concern to healthcare leaders. 
This section includes the analysis of the influence of four facets of negative impacts: (1) 
unavailability of information, (2) workflow disruptions, (3) usability issues, and (4) operational 
feasibility.  
Information Unavailability:  It should be noted that a question about the impact of privacy 
safeguards on availability of information was not explicitly asked during the interviews. Rather, 
the informants themselves introduced this challenge into the course of explaining the impact of 
implementation of privacy safeguards. This challenge was described by one Chief of Information 
Security Officer as having two directives:  
“Our role is to protect it [patient information], make sure that confidentiality, integrity 
and availability is there for us but that we can also get it [patient information] into the 
hands of the patient.  And, to be honest with you, it’s going to be a challenge.  It’s almost 
like having two directives.  A lot of healthcare facilities concentrate on trying to keep 
everything tight to the chest . . . but at the same time we now have mandates that say we 
have to make it available in a variety of formats to our patients. ” 
Several healthcare leaders discussed the ways in which implementing privacy safeguards 
influenced the availability or accessibility of patient information.  Lacking access to the 
information needed to perform his or her job is a big hurdle for any healthcare professional. For 
example, doctors need to see a patient’s medications list or their lab tests, but may not need to 
see a progress note on a psychiatric condition or a psychotherapy note. The desire to balance the 
implementation of privacy programs and the healthcare delivery appeared to have created a 
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serious issue for clinicians trying to provide care for their patients, which ended up opening 
doors for potential unauthorized access and impacting their privacy compliance. As was noted by 
one of the healthcare executives:  
“The biggest challenge with respect to privacy and healthcare, in my mind, is this notion 
that you have to err on the side of providing additional information access. You can’t 
afford to put a barrier in front of a physician or a clinician when they need to have 
access to the information. So you have to sometimes err on providing broader access 
than you might think you need, because you don’t necessarily know what you need about 
those people who need to have access to. That does raise challenges, because that then 
allows those individuals [to access] information that they don’t need to see.” 
Another healthcare executive noted that:  
“One of the challenges with my area is when we try to secure the information but, yet, 
our healthcare providers need quick access to it.  So there’s always kind of a fine line 
there. We try to make it as accessible as possible but, yet, have security measures in 
place to protect those assets.” 
Such an  imbalance challenge is potentially impacting privacy compliance. Indeed, when 
healthcare leaders described the challenges of information availability and data accessibility, 
they connected it to their compliance with healthcare regulations. There is a worrisome aspect of 
compliance concerning the law and its impact on privacy compliance. It is well described in a 
following statement made by one of the study participants:  
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“We have lots of policies and everybody else has lots of policies, but we can’t meet the 
regulations in the strictest letter of the law and offer clinicians the ability to practice in 
an efficient, cost-effective manner.” 
Workflow Disruptions: As part of the interview protocol (Appendix A), the first author 
explored the impact of privacy and security safeguards on healthcare workflows. Comments 
about workflow disruptions issues came up during the semi-structured interviewing. The data 
analysis shows that these workflow disruptions were reflected through conflicts and push-backs 
from employees: “If the security is too hard, people wouldn’t do it. If it is beyond their workflow 
much, they won’t do it.” In addition, another informant stated: “I tell people all the time that 
security flies in the face of convenience; that’s just the way . . . so a lot of push-backs or 
complaints” and “do you want me not to administer that medication because everything didn’t 
line up in the security behind the scenes?” 
The enactment of certain privacy technologies resulted in conflicts and push-backs. For 
example, timeout features are supposed to log off employees whose sessions are inactive in order 
to prevent unauthorized access by other employees. While this feature theoretically seems to be a 
great privacy initiative, it is not always positively received by certain healthcare professionals, 
especially by doctors in emergency departments. One privacy leader stated: 
“Once I log in, I don’t want the system to log me out automatically. I don’t like it and 
timeout features.  There’s timeout in all our systems. This is something we have to work 
around.” 
Another example of workflow disruptions is password management. Healthcare is 
swamped with different applications, and employees have to log on into different systems to 
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access information about their patients. One informant commented on the difficulty in managing 
different passwords: “I am using application A, application B, and you get all these passwords 
you got to remember.  Guess what?  I am going to start writing them down.” Employees start 
writing down their passwords, which potentially makes the organizational network easily 
accessible to hackers or unethical co-workers. This ultimately hinders privacy compliance 
instead of facilitating it as first intended by instating a password. 
Organizations tend to consider these impacts in order to avoid push-backs and 
workarounds: “We try to take that into account, the workflow issues, when you are looking at a 
policy because there is no sense in establishing a policy that people will not adhere to.” 
Although mitigation tools were put in place to bring the hospitals into compliance, in some cases, 
they end up negatively impacting the hospitals’ adherence to regulations. In the case of 
workflow disruptions issues, employees found ways around these mitigations tools to 
accomplish their duties. This disruption is illustrated by the nurses’ work practices that one of 
the study informants shared:  
“40% of the work that a nurse does is to administer medication. 40% of her day, she is 
looking for pills and administering them  . . . She is logging in and waiting, waiting, 
waiting, waiting. That is a problem; she is not going to get her job done. It’s hard enough 
to do the charting, administering medicine without the waiting, waiting, waiting, waiting. 
So what most hospitals do is they have these computers-on-wheels, and they wheel [such 
a computer] into the patient’s room and they leave it logged on and they administer the 
medicine and they wheel it out and they leave it logged on, and then they go into the next 
room and then leave it logged on. But when they go back to the medicine room it’s logged 
on and that’s a security risk.” 
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In the case of password management, employees are writing down their passwords, 
which means they become easily accessible to hackers or unethical co-workers. This ultimately 
hinders privacy compliance instead of facilitating it as first intended by instating a password. 
Usability Issues: The usability challenges that were found during data analysis include current 
applications or systems of electronic health records (EHRs). The challenges arise from dealing 
with inherent difficulties associated with the task of using certain applications. Over the course 
of this study, healthcare executives explained that they had to take into consideration the 
usability of the privacy safeguards they put in place or embedded in their IT applications:   
“It comes from EHRs’ usability and access to information. I mean, in certain scenarios, I 
would like to walk in with a purely clinician’s hat on. I like to walk into a room and see 
the patient’s information, talk with that patient, and provide the care. But somehow I 
have to be acknowledged as being allowed to see that information. So, that is one of the 
conflicts. I have to log in or else I have to use an RFID tag or swipe something to get into 
that record.” 
 If a new privacy or security feature is hard to use or difficult to navigate, users will 
abandon it, as was clearly stated by an informant: “If it is not usable to them, they won’t use it. 
And the things that are very usable to them, they are used to them, they can; I’ve seen this all the 
time.” Therefore, not accounting for the usability issues causes employees not to use privacy 
protocols or to find ways around them to accomplish their tasks, which could negatively impact 
the organizational privacy compliance. 
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Operational Feasibility Issues: Many of the informants commented on the operational 
feasibility of the privacy safeguards implemented in their hospitals, which usually involves 
resources, time, and efficiency. As stated by one of the informants: 
“So it does have an impact on resources and operation.  You’re going to get to a point 
where people are going to have to have staff in place to just deal with that one situation, 
just to keep up with what they’re going to have to do to make sure they protect themselves. 
It’s got to be costing us money or it’s got to be costing us efficiency.”  
For example, implementing automated analytics that trigger an alert whenever a doctor 
accesses a patient’s record that has the same last name as the doctor’s can involve so many 
people and processes that it could impact the overall performance of healthcare delivery.  With 
regard to healthcare regulations, hospitals are facing major operational issues due to how 
healthcare policies are crafted. The challenges that healthcare leaders face regarding operational 
feasibility are weighed against the patient’s best interests and, therefore, the impact privacy 
compliance. One privacy compliance officer stated: 
“My biggest concern time again comes down to operational feasibility and whether 
what’s being asked is either can be operationalized, or is it going to be detrimental to the 
patient’s best interest, and there is balance, it really is.” 
The above categories, and representative data for each of them, are presented in Appendix C. 
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4.2 Positive Impacts 
We have identified three factors with regard to the positive impact of privacy safeguards: 
controlled access, deterrence effect, and tracking mechanisms. 
Controlled Access: The enactment of technical privacy safeguards, such as role-based access 
control mechanisms, allowed for better control over who could access the system. Filtering out 
users who have no business looking at patients’ data was a positive impact of privacy safeguard 
enactments, as commented by a healthcare executive: “We have a role-based access, and that’s 
very important, because you don’t want to give employees any more access than what they 
need . . .  So basically, what we do is we look at the information system and the duties of the 
employee and we base their access on that” 
Deterrence Effect: Informants emphasized the ability of a deterrence approach to create an 
environment of fear when rules are not followed. This fear was perceived as a positive impact, 
because it sets an example and deters other employees from inappropriately handling patients’ 
information. A Chief Privacy Officer of a large hospital used an analogy to refer to how his 
organization benefits from a deterrence approach: 
 “It is sort of user grisly analogy. Back in medieval England when they chopped people’s 
heads off, they would put [that] head on a pike, and they stick it on the London Bridge, 
and the idea was that it would allow you to see who had their head chopped off. It was a 
very public hanging. And so, it’s the same thing here, we can’t necessarily say who we 
fire, but you hope the word gets out, you hope the employee that gets fired almost says, I 
can’t believe they fired me for looking at that. Well okay fine, I want you to tell your co-
workers, because I want your coworkers to say, I am not going to do this again because I 
don’t want to have the same thing happen to me, or I don’t want to be suspended.” 
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Tracking Mechanisms: The ability to track the identity of the users who accessed what 
information along with when it was accessed was perceived by organizational leaders as a major 
positive impact of privacy safeguard enactments. One Chief Medical Information Officer stated: 
“One of the nice things about EHRs is when somebody signs in, you know who signed in 
and what time where they are at [a record]  . . .  We have tracking mechanisms to be able 
to determine if I log into a chart and I go look at a nurse I work with it. Well the system 
really knows who I am looking at here. So if I am taking care of her [the nurse] as a 
patient in the emergency department. That would be clinically appropriate. If I have 
never seen her as a physician-patient relationship and I am looking at her chart, well that 
is completely inappropriate.” 
The above categories and representative data for each of them are presented in Appendix D. 
4.3 Imbalance Challenge 
Capturing the imbalance challenge was a major finding in this study. The imbalance 
challenge is an analytical construct that was created to make sense of what organizations 
reported they are faced with as a result of enacting information privacy safeguards. As shown in 
Figure 3, an imbalance challenge occurs when the negative impacts of enacting privacy 
safeguards outweigh the positive ones. The challenge resides in the organizations’ struggles in 
maintaining patient privacy and without inhibiting business processes. One privacy officer 
illustrated this imbalance challenge by stating: 
“The biggest challenge with respect to privacy and health care in my mind is this notion 
that you have to err on the side of providing additional information access. You can’t 
25 
 
afford to put a barrier in front of a physician or clinician when they need to have access 
to the information.” 
The imbalance challenge is of great concern to healthcare privacy leaders, especially in light of 
upcoming regulations. This concern is illustrated by a chief privacy officer: 
 “The federal law is toying with the idea of making sure that data at rest is encrypted. Not 
the movement of the data.  In other words, if one of my hard drives would be encrypted 
and if somebody needs to get data unencrypted and pass it forward, that’s going to be 
almost impossible to put in place. This is because none of the environments, none of the 
vendors have built their systems that way.” 
 
Figure 3 –The Imbalance Challenge  
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4.4 Organizational Context 
 The primary dimensions of organizational context that emerged from this study include 
hospital size, academic status, leader’s educational background, and leadership commitment.  
Hospital Size: Based on initial data gathering and analysis, large healthcare organizations are 
more likely to better respond to privacy issues than small ones, because they can afford to hire 
consultants to provide comprehensive assessments. Organization size has been positively related 
to adoption behaviors (Rogers 1995) and negatively related to regulatory compliance (Baron and 
Baron 1980). Large hospitals’ perspectives on the effect of the hospital size was captured and 
illustrated by a Chief Privacy Officer from a large hospital: 
“If you ask me if I think that the medium-to small-sized institutions did everything. I think 
they did what they thought they needed to do.  I think their intentions were good, but I 
don’t believe that they are as sophisticated.  So it’s probably the difference between when 
you hand your bank card to the local hair stylist, and you hope that they do a pretty good 
job with not losing your credit card information, versus handing your credit card to 
Citibank that has much more sophisticated systems and so on and so forth.  You know 
there’s some of that human error thing that comes into it, and a different mindset that 
comes into it.”  
 For large hospitals, the ability to properly respond to privacy threats is closely linked to 
available resources, which could be a major constraint for smaller hospitals. This argument 
translates into cutting corners and not hiring the appropriate entities to assist in interpreting the 
law.  A privacy officer of a large hospital illustrated this viewpoint as follows: 
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“What many of the smaller and medium-sized institutions did was try to skimp and rather 
than hire a consultant or an attorney to help them where they didn’t have the resources to 
allow them to (a) interpret the law, interpret HIPAA; (b) implement, operationalize it.  
What they did rather than hiring the appropriate people because they didn’t have the 
resources to do so, was they tried to figure it out on their own and the one complaint that 
I have seen many times and I think HHS has gotten many complaints about this is 
companies misinterpreting HIPAA.” 
 Interviewing informants from smaller hospitals helped to reveal a significant difference 
in opinion, since their responses clearly challenged the previous statement made by an informant 
based in a large hospital. This opposing view can be succinctly illustrated by statement made by 
a CEO of a small hospital: “Because we’re smaller and more contained, we may be able to 
control it a little better.” Smaller hospitals look at the issues in terms of proportions: “I’m 
thinking of Hospital X and you’ve been in that hospital probably. I mean there are so many 
points of access there, so many people and so many workstations and so much [is] happening 
and paper is everywhere.  It may be more of a challenge for them to adhere to the standards than 
here at this little hospital.” Or in terms of HIPAA officers, “I have one (HIPAA officer) person 
to worry about 120 employees. If you had 12,000 employees, to get that same ratio you’d have to 
have 100 HIPAA officers.” 
Organization’s Academic Status. Among the healthcare organizations interviewed, academic 
hospitals are associated with large hospitals and tied to medical schools and ongoing research 
about protected health information (PHI). These organizations have very well-established rules 
and IRBs with regard to PHI. Therefore, institutions with teaching hospitals have an existing 
culture of privacy practices. Healthcare organizations with academic affiliations showed 
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evidence of more awareness of privacy through stricter guidelines for medical students, resulting 
in expulsion from medical programs when patient’s privacy guidelines were not observed 
properly. Teaching and research hospitals are also more aware of the secondary use of patient 
data. 
Professional Background of Privacy Officers. Under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, every healthcare organization must designate a privacy officer. The 
data revealed that healthcare organizations comply with this provision mainly by adding this 
function to the list of duties performed by an existing employee. As one IT director stated:  “We 
have privacy officers . . .  none of our privacy officers are full time, meaning they have other 
jobs.”  The privacy informants, though they performed similar functions as privacy leaders, had 
different business and/or educational backgrounds, which could have affected their business 
vision of how privacy responses should be handled. It is worth noting that while the educational 
background could have impacted the weight of one type of safeguards versus another, in the end, 
what mattered was how much they were involved in protecting patients’ information. 
Leadership Commitment. The aforementioned findings triggered a theoretical sampling for the 
purpose of pursuing a potential pattern related to the hospital’s size and its academic status 
(teaching, non-teaching). The findings showed that regardless of a hospital’s size, culture seems 
to determine the attitude toward information privacy safeguards and the organizations’ actions, 
regardless of its resources. Furthermore, the commitment from the top management appeared to 
transcend the limited resources in small hospitals. For example, while large hospitals hire 
consultants to assess and review their processes and technologies, smaller hospitals can be very 
creative in accomplishing the same objective with much smaller budgets. One Chief Privacy 
Officer commented on leadership commitment:  
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“If you don’t have that [buy-in from leadership], no matter what you implement, you are 
not going to have the resources in the first place.” 
The above categories and representative data for each item in the organizational context are 
presented in detail in Appendix E.  
5. EMERGING THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section presents the theoretical framework grounded by the findings from the 
empirical study with support from the relevant extant literature. This study led to the emergence 
of major categories: the enactment of privacy safeguards, negative and positive impacts, the 
imbalance challenge, and privacy compliance. Close analysis of the data revealed interrelations 
among these categories and allowed for their integration into a theoretical framework (Strauss et 
al. 1998). These major categories are found within both the IS and health informatics 
communities, yet they are very seldom interconnected in the literature. We present a theoretical 
framework that unifies these concepts and thereby contributes to the explanation of the 
consequences of privacy safeguards’ enactment and the cause of the imbalance challenge.  
In using grounded theory, Urquhart (2010) emphasized leveraging a systematic and 
iterative approach to theory conceptualization. Embracing this approach enabled further analysis 
of the negative impacts. We pursued a theoretical sampling in an attempt to increase our 
knowledge of the intended and unintended consequences of privacy safeguards’ enactment, their 
impact on business practices, and their implications for privacy compliance.  
Further analysis allowed us to distinguish between: (1) organizations where leaders were 
not aware of the negative impacts, and (2) organizations that were aware of the negative impacts 
and accounted for the imbalance challenge in how they responded to privacy threats.  In fact, 
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when asked how they measured the effectiveness of their safeguards, former organizations 
indicated that there were no formal metrics in place to assess the impacts, positive or negative, of 
their privacy safeguards’ implementation. Instead, they relied on the number of complaints, or 
reported breaches, as an indication of the effectiveness of their safeguards. Once these 
organizations became aware of the negative impacts, they considered revisiting their safeguards 
to account for the imbalance challenge.  In these instances, awareness only happened when 
privacy compliance became an issue. If the organizations’ privacy compliances were not in 
jeopardy, would they ever become aware of any negative impacts? Additional analysis revealed 
that organizations that were aware of the negative impacts had performed some sort of risk 
assessment. Such initiatives allowed organizations to look out for these impacts and sometimes 
to prevent or minimize them. Ultimately, a proactive assessment versus a reactive approach 
seems to distinguish these two types of organizations and further explains the imbalance 
challenge. Indeed, organizations with a proactive approach are trying to develop their metrics to 
assess negative impacts. Relationships between the imbalance challenge, privacy safeguards, 
impacts, and privacy compliance are depicted using propositions in Figure 4. 
When considering the relationship between privacy safeguards and the imbalance 
challenge, the study revealed that the implementation of privacy safeguards does not necessarily 
lead to positive impacts. We draw attention to the negative impacts that were not unnoticed to 
healthcare leaders. On the contrary, organizations face major challenges when they became 
aware of negative impacts. This study allowed for distinctions between: (1) organizations where 
leaders were not aware of the negative impacts and (2) organizations where leaders were aware 
of the negative impacts and accounted for the imbalance challenge in their responses to privacy 
threats.  In fact, when asked how they measured the effectiveness of their safeguards, these 
 organizations indicated that there were no formal metrics in place to assess the impacts, positive 
or negative, of their privacy safeguards’ implementation. Instead, they relied on the number of 
complaints, or reported breaches, as an indication of the effectiveness of their safeguards. Once 
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Recognizing the state of imbalance in which negative impacts overpower positive 
impacts constitutes a strong conceptual foundation of the upshot of a privacy safeguard in 
healthcare organizations. 
 In this study, awareness is linked with how proactive a hospital is in handling the threats 
and the controls. Whereas proactive organizations are capable of identifying and acting upon the 
negative impacts of enacting privacy safeguards, reactive organizations become aware much 
later (i.e. when privacy complaints or breaches are reported). A priori awareness of potential 
negative impacts allows for the implementation of the appropriate safeguards, to minimize the 
negative impacts and maximize the positive impacts. Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 1: In the absence of a proactive approach, the implementation of privacy 
safeguards is more likely to lead to: a) a higher degree of negative impacts and b) a lower 
degree of positive impacts. 
With regard to the first research question on the positive and negative business impacts in 
implementing information privacy safeguards, the findings identified more factors than those 
exhibited by the literature. Healthcare leaders provided many examples in terms of how they 
implemented privacy protective safeguards and how they were mindful of the negative impacts 
associated with these safeguards. But in discussing the negative impacts on practices, factors that 
were positively impacting healthcare practices were also identified.  
5.1 Effect of Positive and Negative Impacts on the Imbalance Challenge  
Organizations implement privacy safeguards for the purposes of mitigating information 
privacy threats and ensuring legal compliance. However, much of the research on privacy 
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safeguards assumes a positive impact where the sequels of post implementation (negative impact) 
are often overlooked. In this research, the emergence of negative impacts was an important 
concept. These types of impacts tend to negatively shift the organizations’ desired balance. For 
example, we expect the unavailability of information needed to treat a patient to create an 
environment of an imbalance challenge between protecting patient information and treating the 
patient. Similarly, disruptions in workflow, usability, and operational issues are slowing down 
healthcare delivery. Ideally, an organization will want to minimize the negative impacts and 
enhance the positive ones. This is because healthcare organizations seek to achieve both 
protection of patients’ information and regulatory compliance.  In doing so, they implement 
privacy safeguards in order to minimize privacy breaches and abide by regulatory pressures.  
Based on these findings, we suggest that although a higher degree of negative impacts of 
adopting privacy safeguards lead to a higher degree of imbalance, organizations leverage the 
positive impacts of adopting privacy safeguards to further minimize the negative impacts. 
Therefore, the following proposition and its sub-propositions are suggested: 
Proposition 2: An imbalance challenge will result if the negative impacts outweigh the 
positive ones. After an imbalance challenge occurs: 
Proposition 2a: A higher degree of negative impacts leads to a higher degree of 
imbalance challenge.  
Proposition 2b: A higher degree of positive impacts leads to a lower degree of 
the imbalance challenge.  
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The data revealed that the implementation of information privacy protective safeguards is 
impacting healthcare work practices through positive and negative impacts and thus creating the 
imbalance challenge. Achieving a balance in privacy and utility by maximally reducing negative 
impacts was challenging because of the dynamic environment surrounding healthcare delivery. 
The dynamics inherent in medical practices, such as scheduled and unscheduled patient visits, 
clinicians’ unscheduled shifts, and workforce needed at unexpected times and locations, often 
conflicted with privacy role-based access safeguards (Boxwala et al. 2011) and therefore made 
the imbalance challenge even more important. The positive impact of privacy protective 
safeguards may function as a facilitator to privacy compliance, while negative impacts may 
function as inhibitors. Identifying these impacts is not enough. Healthcare leaders must also 
address the imbalance challenge that ultimately defines the level of their privacy compliance. In 
the section below, we will address the second research question on the outcomes of the 
imbalance challenge.  
5.2 Effect of the Imbalance Challenge on Privacy Compliance 
The findings suggest that the issues surrounding the organizational struggles to meet the 
ever-increasing privacy constraints and to comply with regulatory requirements have become a 
central concern to healthcare leaders. In particular, the imbalance challenge emerged as the key 
concept with regard to these struggles. An unattended imbalance challenge can potentially be 
harmful to the organization’s privacy compliance. This study provides evidence that healthcare 
professionals may see a need to improvise or work around privacy safeguards. Existing health 
informatics literature describes workarounds as clever alternative methods developed by the 
users to accomplish what the system does not easily allow them to do (Ash et. al., 2004). Morath 
and Turnbull (2005) define workarounds as ‘‘work patterns an individual or a group of 
35 
 
individuals create to accomplish a crucial work goal within a system of dysfunctional work 
processes that prohibits the accomplishment of that goal or makes it difficult’’ (p. 52).  
Workaround has been recognized in both IS and health informatics literature (Pollock 2005), 
however limited studies theorize this concept (Halbesleben et al. 2008), especially with regard to 
information privacy.  
This study provides three themes with regard to workarounds: conditions leading to workarounds, 
evidence of these workarounds, and concerns and potential consequences of these workarounds. 
These themes are summarized in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 – Model of Workarounds   
Healthcare professionals seek to balance privacy demands with the need to provide care 
for their patients, all in an efficient manner. This study provides evidence of the struggles that 
privacy leaders face as the effects of the imbalance challenge. A striking example was provided 
by a Chief Privacy Officer who stated that clinicians sometimes bypass privacy safeguards to do 
their job, which involves saving lives. He emphasized that he would rather explain the office of 
civil rights why one of the hospital’s employee inappropriately accessed information (e.g., used 
someone else’s log in credentials) rather than explain to a family that he could not save their 
loved one because of privacy safeguard enactments. The concern surrounding such action is the 
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possibility that the same access that saved lives could hinder privacy compliance. The same 
Chief Privacy Officer referred to the case of the Arizona Representative who was admitted to a 
hospital after being shot, and how several employees lost their jobs for inappropriately looking 
up her medical records.  
This study provides evidence, with support from the literature, that when negative 
impacts outweigh positive impacts, healthcare professionals may see a need to improvise or 
workaround their work practices. For example, information unavailability can be circumvented 
by users borrowing passwords or smart cards to access records that they are not authorized to 
access (France 1998). They may also ignore required encryption mechanisms because of their 
impact on job performance. The potential harm resides in the subsequent use of patients’ 
information (e.g., copying, transmitting) under different users’ log-ins. In light of these struggles 
and the imbalance challenge, organizations will continue to face breaches, because their 
programs are not effective and are not accounting for these tensions (Culnan and Williams 2009). 
Thus, we propose that workarounds act as mediators between the imbalance challenge and 
privacy compliance. This leads to the following propositions: 
Proposition 4:  The stronger the imbalance challenge, the higher the frequency of 
workarounds will occur. 
Proposition 5:  The higher the frequency of workarounds, the lower the degree of 
organizational privacy compliance. 
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5.3 Effect of Leadership Commitment on the Imbalance Challenge 
This study has unveiled how organizations differently handle the imbalance challenge 
through the amount of support they receive from their top management. At an early stage of our 
analysis, we expected the hospital size to dictate the degree of commitment to compliance. In 
other words, we expected to find that larger hospitals with more resources would strive to 
achieve a higher degree of privacy compliance and better address imbalances issues. We further 
analyzed that pattern to discover that, while the hospital size matters because it is often closely 
linked with resources, it is the commitment of top managers that prevails. Prior research found 
that top executives’ values and commitments influence organizational outcomes and impacts, 
because these executives hold the powers to influence organizational actions (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1990). As a result, top management would invest in privacy programs to demonstrate 
their commitments to the impact of these programs. Top management support emerged as an 
essential element impacting the level of privacy compliance. In this study, when clinicians could 
not access the records they needed, policies were reviewed by the healthcare leaders and a 
“break-the-glass” feature was created to allow clinicians to bypass access controls. The absence 
of leadership commitment to privacy posed ethical conflicts for employees in charge of day-to-
day privacy behaviors (Smith 1993). Therefore, a commitment from the leadership is important 
to the success and more positive impact of privacy safeguards (Culnan and Williams 2009). 
Therefore: 
Proposition 6: With stronger leadership commitment, the proposed positive association 
between the degree of the imbalance challenge and the frequency of workarounds will be 
weaker. 
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5.4 Relating the Imbalance Challenge to the Literature  
This section attempts to compare the categories and relationships of the theoretical 
framework of the imbalance challenge with those from related literature. 
When relating the imbalance challenge to the literature, we applied the lens of balance 
theory to seek an explanation for the contradictory positive and negative impacts and the 
imbalance challenge. According to Heider (1946) and Lewin (1951), Balance Theory is viewed 
as a structural arrangement between social actors and affective ties. If these arrangements create 
an imbalance (tension or strain), actors will take actions to reduce this imbalance. For example, 
as a result of discomfort in a relationship, an actor may take a detachment action. Contrary to the 
balance theory’s expectation of detachment, our data found that once healthcare leaders became 
aware of negative impacts, they worked on resolving those negative impacts rather than 
distancing themselves. In situations where privacy safeguards were in the way of healthcare 
delivery, healthcare leaders increased their involvement rather than reduced it. For example, 
when needed information was not available to clinicians, policies were reviewed by leaders and a 
“break-the-glass” feature was created to allow clinicians to bypass access controls. Also, because 
of the penalties associated with breaches, organizations could not afford to avoid taking actions. 
The opposing concepts of negative and positive impacts of the imbalance challenge led 
us to consider the privacy calculus theory in the privacy literature (see Culnan and Bies 2003 for 
a review).  This theoretical framework has been applied at the individual level (e.g., Dinev and 
Hart 2006; Xu et al. 2010) and provides insights that are worth taking into account at the 
organizational level. Privacy calculus considers two sets of opposing factors: inhibitors and 
facilitators to behavioral intentions (such as willingness to conduct online transaction or intention 
to disclose information). A user’s decision to transact online is based on the outcome of 
39 
 
weighing both sets of factors: if the effects of the facilitating factors (i.e., trust and control) are 
greater than those of inhibiting factors (i.e., privacy concerns and perceived risk), the user is 
more likely to engage in an eCommerce transaction. While the individual user has to make a 
priori decisions, the theoretical model of the imbalance challenge pertains to consequences of 
these decisions at the organizational level. Moreover, the privacy calculus allows the individual 
user to “calculate” if it is beneficial or not to engage in an online transaction, whereas in the 
theoretical model of the imbalance challenge, organizations do not “calculate,” but rather deal 
with the consequences, which is the imbalance challenge. The imbalance challenge results from 
negative impacts outweighing positive impacts. 
Theoretically speaking, we view the imbalance challenge as an important addition to the 
theoretical framework. Recognizing the state of imbalance in which negative impacts overwhelm 
positive impact constitutes a strong conceptual foundation of the impact of privacy safeguards’ 
implementation.  
The two research questions investigated in this study directed our attention to the 
importance of negative impacts that cause the imbalance challenge when it comes to 
organizational privacy compliance. In considering potential solutions for the complex issue of 
the imbalance challenge, it is imperative to consider these challenges in light of risk management. 
Consequently, we argue for a proactive approach that could prevent or at least lessen the 
negative impacts – a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). Previous studies defined the PIA as a 
risk management tool used to assess the use of privacy safeguards (Culnan and Williams 2009). 
The PIA is advocated by several federal agencies. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
utilizes the PIA as a decision-making tool designed to identify and mitigate privacy risks at the 
beginning and throughout the development life cycle of a program (DHS 2010). In accordance 
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with the guidelines of the e-Government Act of 2002, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) started to promote the PIA as an assessment mechanism for evaluating the level 
of the patients’ information protection (HHS 2011b). Therefore, we believe that there is a 
reasonable potential for transferability of the PIA approach from the federal level to other levels, 
such as the organizational level (i.e., hospitals). And it is essential to simultaneously assess the 
privacy risks and potential business impacts (Parks et al. 2011b). We believe that a better 
understanding of the PIA will further enhance the theoretical and practical understanding of 
privacy safeguards and, more importantly, their potential negative impacts on healthcare delivery 
processes.  
6.  DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATION 
This study aims to contribute to existing privacy research in several ways. First, our 
primary contribution is to respond to the compelling call for research investigating the 
effectiveness and consequences of enacting privacy safeguards (Belanger and Crossler, 2011). 
To date, most studies on privacy focus on designing and implementing the appropriate 
safeguards to mitigate information privacy threats, and there has been a notable lack of research 
on the outcomes of privacy safeguards enactments. Our emerging theoretical framework 
highlights the importance of the analytical construct we developed–the Imbalance Challenge–to 
capture the unintended consequences caused by the situation where the negative impacts of 
privacy safeguards outweigh the positive ones. Analyzing these opposing impacts is important, 
because it enables us to assess and account for their implications for work practices and for 
privacy compliance. 
Second, this research provides new theoretical insights into understanding privacy 
management by targeting the organizational level of analysis through a grounded theory 
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approach. In the IS field, Smith et al. (2011, p. 1006) have made an explicit call for research on 
studying information privacy at the organization level: 
“Indeed, most rigorous studies of organizational privacy policies and practices 
would likely include a set of exhaustive interviews with an organization’s 
members and stakeholders, and some amount of deep process tracing would also 
likely be involved.  Such studies are the best approach to uncovering the 
somewhat subtle organizational dynamics that drive privacy policies and 
practices.” 
Methodologically, using a grounded theory provides a rich lens through which to 
understand the consequences of privacy safeguards enactments and their implications for privacy 
compliance. Grounded theory methodology was selected because of the lack of existing theory to 
explain how organizations interpret the implications of privacy safeguard enactments, the 
contextualization of the healthcare domain, practical relevance, and suitability to study 
healthcare processes. Based on a grounded theory study spanning over 16 months in which we 
were able to interview thirty privacy leaders from several healthcare organizations, including the 
government, the study uncovered subtle organizational dynamics that would not have emerged 
through quick data collection techniques such as online surveys. The ability to revisit the 
interview questions and the target population to include more pertinent questions and participants 
was crucial for reaching saturation, where all concepts are well defined and no new concepts 
emerge (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
The findings of this study have useful practical implications for healthcare organizations 
in general and hospitals in particular. The emergence of the imbalance challenge provides a 
clearer understanding of the unintended consequences of privacy safeguard enactments and their 
implications for the organization’s overall privacy compliance. 
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This study is evaluated through Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Corbin and Strauss (2008) 
eight evaluative criteria for the empirical grounding (Appendix F) and seven criteria for judging 
a grounded theory research process (Appendix G).  
There are several limitations of the study. With regard to the validity of the emerging 
theory, it is worth referring to generalizability, which is “the validity of a theory in a setting 
different from the one where it was empirically tested and confirmed” (Lee et al. 2003, p. 221). 
Lee and Baskerville clarified that the appropriate type of generalizability (not just statistical) 
should be applied to this particular type of study. The purpose of this study was not to achieve 
statistical validation, but rather to discover patterns for the purpose of theory building and 
gaining a better understanding of the main issues in its context. It is reasonable to assume that the 
insights of the emerging framework would guide future research to a more formal theory 
(Orlikowski 1993).    
This work creates numerous future research opportunities. First, our study was conducted 
with the objectives of examining and identifying the factors that impact the imbalance challenge 
at the organizational level. Hence, there is an opportunity to research this imbalance impact from 
an individual level of analysis. Indeed, employees have different stakes in the organization based 
on their employment status (full-time/part-time, contract/permanent, staff/management) that 
could impact how receptive they are to privacy safeguards. Second, the findings show that 
hospitals are taking different attitudes toward the imbalance challenge, based on their top 
management commitment. Therefore, a second research opportunity is to further examine the 
correlations among leadership style and negative impacts. Doing so could facilitate the 
development of programs supported by executive to effectively act on the imbalance challenge. 
Finally, the findings are based on the U.S. hospitals, and some IS researchers demonstrated that 
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there were differences in information privacy issues across countries and cultures (Bellman et al. 
2004; Milberg et al. 2000). Therefore, a third research opportunity could be a comparative study 
of the factors impacting this imbalance, while taking into consideration the cultural influences. 
7. CONCLUSION  
Recent literature suggests that the most existing information privacy research focuses on 
the enactment of privacy safeguards and neglects the actual outcomes of the practices in which 
organizations engage. This study focuses on understanding the imbalance challenge between 
privacy requirements and healthcare business practices by identifying the positive and negative 
impacts. This research responds to a theoretical challenge that was overlooked in prior research, 
and it makes the following essential contributions: 1) it introduces a theoretical model of the 
imbalance challenge that accounts for negative impacts of privacy safeguards, 2) it identifies the 
opposing impacts of privacy safeguards and the importance of the imbalance challenge, 3) it 
explores the imbalance implications for privacy compliance, and 4) it discovers an important 
correlation between how effectively organizations handle the imbalance challenge and how 
much support they receive from top management. Finally, the study argues for a privacy impact 
assessment (PIA) as a proactive solution to handle the imbalance challenge. The PIA allows 
organizations to simultaneously assess privacy risks and practical impacts. As a result, 
organizations will be able to better understand and handle the imbalance challenge and 
ultimately achieve a better compliance without impeding their healthcare practices. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Protocol 
The protocol for interviewing information privacy informants followed the following five steps: 
Step1: The first author explained in detail the purpose of the study, confidentiality of the data 
collected and the option to opt out and/or not respond to questions they judged sensitive. 
Step 2: We use semi-structured interviews format. Sample questions related to this particular 
study are listed below: 
• What types of measures does your organization have in place to handle the threat of 
privacy issues? Were you subject to ant data breach? 
• Are there any implementation/impact issues of these measures? 
• What type of business conflicts (workflow conflicts) does you organization face in 
developing and enacting these privacy programs? 
• How does your organization balance between its day-to-day operations and privacy 
policies’ implementation? 
Step 3: The first author recorded and transcribed all interviews 
Steps 4: Following each interview, we documented impressions and patterns 
Steps 5: We reviewed recordings and transcripts which led to more detailed questions with 
subsequent interviews 
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Appendix B  
 
Semi –Structured Interview Questions 
This study is part of a dissertation work completed by the first author. Questions have been 
expanded as new categories emerged. Not all questions pertain to this study. 
1. General Information 
a. Interviewee background 
i. Title(s) 
ii. Education background 
iii. Years in profession 
iv. How did you end up in this position 
b. Definition/scope of information privacy 
i. Definition of information privacy 
ii. Is it similar to information security? Why? Why not? 
c. Privacy issues facing healthcare organizations in general 
i. Different Types, levels 
ii. Challenges 
2. Privacy Measures 
a. What types of measures does your organization have in place to handle the threat 
of privacy issues? Were you subject to ant data breach? 
b. How long have you had these programs in place? 
c. Would your hospital consider adding other privacy measures in the future? Why 
or why not? 
d. What might these new measures address? 
e. Do you have privacy impact assessment tools that help you determine if you are 
meeting your legal, technical and policies obligations toward EHRs privacy? 
f. How do you measure your privacy compliance? 
3. Influencing Factors and Values 
a. Why do you respond to privacy threats? 
b. What factors would influence your organization to initiate these particular 
measures? (What prompted your hospital to initiate these measures?) 
c. Are your organization’s privacy measures designed to comply mainly with 
HIPAA and HITECH?  
d. Are there other regulations that you have to comply with?  
e.  Are there any other internal and external factors that dictate how you design your 
privacy programs? 
f. What type of resources (human/financial) does the organization invest in to 
develop privacy policies and programs? 
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g. Are there different degrees of compliance (reactive/proactive/other)? Where are 
you situated and why? 
h. What type of resources would you need to further your commitment to privacy? 
i. Which type of measure would you invest more on if you have extra resources?  
4. Privacy Implementation Issues/ Practices/Enactment 
a. How is privacy practiced? Is it different from one setting (clinical) to others?   
b. What type of business conflicts (workflow conflicts) does you organization face 
in developing and enacting these privacy programs? 
c. What do you do when there is a conflict between your medical clinical work flow 
and mandates from regulations?  
d. How does your organization balance between its day-to-day operations and 
privacy policies’ implementation? 
e. How does training and education align with routing activities? Does it support 
actual practices or it is informational (awareness)? 
f. Are you a part of any HIMSS or CHIME chapters? Do you ever use your 
associations with these chapters to raise privacy mandates that are in conflict with 
your workflow processes?  Has it ever been lobbied? 
g. Under what scenario, would an organization not comply with regulations? 
h. How do you balance privacy with convenience (for employees and for patients) 
5. Privacy Design 
a. What is the inputs of users into the design and development of privacy programs 
b. Is patients’ feedback sought at any point in time with these privacy programs? 
c. Is there a particular relationship with your vendors, what is the impact of vendors 
into embedding security and privacy features into the software? 
6. Concluding Questions 
a. Are there other issues related to privacy programs that we haven’t discussed but 
that would be important for me to know? 
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Appendix C 
Illustrative Supporting Data for Negative Impacts 
2
nd
 Order  
Themes 
Illustrative 1
st
 Order Data 
Information 
Unavailability 
“We don’t want to keep information out of the hands of people who need it. So 
if we develop something that is too stringent…they can’t do their job the right 
way.” 
 “One of the challenges with my area is when we try to secure the information 
but yet our healthcare providers need quick access to it.  So there’s always 
kind of a fine line there. We try to make it as accessible as possible but yet 
have security measures in place to protect those assets.” 
 “We have lots of policies and everybody else has lots of policies but we can’t 
meet the regulations in the strictest letter of the law and offer clinicians their 
ability to practice in an efficient cost effective manner.” 
 “I would much rather happen to explain to the office of civil rights why some 
body inappropriately access information than explain to a family why their 
loved one is dead and they wouldn’t have been dead had the information we 
had in our possession wasn’t accessible to the people treating that patient” 
Workflow Disruption 
“If the security is too hard, people wouldn’t do it. If it is beyond their work 
flow much, they won’t do it.” 
 “I tell people all the time that security flies in the face of convenience that’s 
just the way it’s always is… so a lot of push back or complain.” 
“Do you want me not to administer that medication because everything didn’t 
line up in the security behind the scenes?” 
 “Once I log in, I don’t want the system to log me out automatically. I don’t 
like it. ” 
 
“Time out features.  There’s times out in all our system end this is something 
we have to work around.  You know we have some key systems in the 
emergency department and what they’re saying … We have a twenty minute 
time out feature …   if I’m a doctor in the emergency room and my system 
times out on me while I am critically working on a patient … I have to [enter]  
my password, that’s not a good thing.” 
 
 “I’m using application A, application B and you get all these passwords you 
got to remember.  Guess what?  I’m going to start writing them down. ” 
 
 “40% of the work that a nurse does is to administer medication. 40% of her 
day, she is looking at pills and administering them. … she is logging in and 
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waiting, waiting, waiting, waiting, that’s a problem she is not going to get her 
job done. It’s hard enough to do the charting, administering medicine without 
the waiting, waiting, waiting, waiting, waiting. So what most hospitals do is 
there have these computers on wheels, they wheel it into the patient room and 
they leave it logged on and they administer the medicine and they wheel it out 
and they leave it logged on and then they go into the next room and then leave 
it logged on but when they go back to the med room it’s logged on and that’s a 
security risk.” 
 
Usability Issues 
 
“It comes from EHR usability and access to information. I mean in certain 
scenarios, I would like to walk in from purely a clinician hat on, I like to walk 
into to room and see that patient’ information , talk with that patient and 
provide the care .but somehow I have to be acknowledge as being allowed to 
see that information. So, that one of the conflicts. I have to log in or else I have 
to use an RFID tag or swipe something to get into that record. ” 
 
“With the privacy and security in healthcare it’s the need for speed.  I don’t 
want to log in twice.  I don’t want to log in this, I don’t want to that.” 
 
“If it is not usable to them, they won’t use it. and the things that are very usable 
to them, that they are used to, they can, I’ve seen this all the time.” 
Operational 
Feasibility 
“My biggest concern time again comes down to operational feasibility and 
weather what’s being asked is either can be operationalized or is it going to be 
detrimental to the patient best interest.” 
“It really comes down to practice.” 
“There is a lot of indirect impact that you have to be careful of its operational 
efficiency you know you have to really look at, you will never get a number 
you look and say oh my God. It’s got to be costing us money or it’s got to be 
costing us efficiency.” 
 “So it does have an impact on resources and operation.  You’re going to get to 
a point where people are going to have to have staff in place to just deal with 
that one situation, just to keep up with what they’re going to have to do to 
make sure they protect themselves.. It’s got to be costing us money or it’s got 
to be costing us efficiency.” 
 “Let’s just say for example, your brother is Don Parks and you are a 
physician, and you are looking up Don Parks records for no reason what so 
ever. An alert is triggered and will be sent to someone who actually sponsors 
your account. It is going to say Rachida Parks looked at Don Parks’ record. 
The person that sponsors you will need to get with you and say who is that? 
You might say that is my brother, and one might say, why did you look at that 
record?  You would say he was not looking good at the family dinner last 
week, so I looked up his record, which will be totally inappropriate. Or you 
could say, Don parks is not related to me, but is a patient of mine. The alerting 
provokes the next level of inquiry. If you were to say the former where you 
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were looking up at your brother’s record and you didn’t really have a reason 
to, then that gets referred to the human resources for discipline.” 
“We got to make sure the things are operationally supportable and I have to 
say that there are aspects of HIPAA that are very difficult to operationalize and 
they really often don’t have a lot of meaning either.” 
“We have lots of policies and everybody else has lots of policies but we can’t 
meet the regulations in the strictest letter of the law and offer clinicians their 
ability to practice in an efficient cost effective manner.” 
“My biggest concern time again comes down to operational feasibility and 
weather what’s being asked is either can be operationalized or is it going to be 
detrimental to the patient best interest and there is balance, it really is.” 
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Appendix D 
Illustrative Supporting Data for Positive Impacts 
2nd Order  
Themes 
Illustrative 1st Order Data 
Controlled Access 
 
“We do have role based security, if we decided that you should have rights to 
getting at certain class of data, we can give it you.. .That’s very important 
because you don’t want to give employees any more access than what they 
need.” 
“Basically what we do is we look at the information system and based on the 
security capabilities and the information system and the duties, or the 
responsibilities or the duties of the employee, we, we give, we base their access 
on that.” 
“we go through our due diligence in regard to what different provider groups 
are allowed to see or should be able to see for their job , they don’t want to stop 
them from providing care for patients obviously and you want to facilitate their 
care for patients but do you really have a true clinic need to be able to do that.” 
“So do you want the environmental health worker to be able to log in to your 
record and see that? Well no, but there may be component of your records that 
are important to the environmental health workers to do their job.” 
Positive Impact 
(Deterrence Effect) 
“I hate to say this, a certain amount of people get caught, you know people 
deciding to look at stuff that they shouldn't. Because you also want to make an 
example out of them,  you know it’s sad to say, what really helps if no one 
looks at it, and if no one looks at things that they shouldn’t, that’s the ideal. You 
know that’s not going to happen. So what you do hope is that when people do 
look at things they shouldn’t, they get caught, we work very hard on that, and 
when they get caught, people find out about them. It’s the deterrent effect.” 
“It is sort of user grisly analogy. Back in medieval England when they chop 
people’s heads off, they would put the head on a pike, and they stick it on the 
London bridge, and the idea was that it would allow you to see who had their 
head chopped off. It was a very public hanging. And so, it’s the same thing 
here, we can’t necessarily say who we fire, but you hope the word gets out, you 
hope the employee that gets fired almost says, I can’t believe they fired me for 
looking at that. well okay fine, I want you to tell your co workers, because I 
want your coworkers to say, I am not going to do this again because I don’t 
want to have the same thing happen to me, or I don’t want to be suspended.” 
“We need to discipline them, we need to make sure that people understand that 
we take this seriously, and hopefully, there is a deterrent effect that occurs from 
other people seeing the fact that people have lost their jobs over. Now the fact 
that only three people in that hospital lost their jobs over it, probably it says to 
me only good thing, because it says to me only three people were dumb enough 
to look at the record.” 
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Positive Impact 
(Tracking 
Mechanisms) 
“We have alerts built in to things, there are alerts for certain people when there 
is a perceived attack or perceived breach so to speak.” 
“We have software which goes through every PC in the house every day 
looking for things on PCs . so we have software in place on emails that look for 
certain patterns of information of people are trying to send out here it will block 
it.” 
“Our system is all doing very advanced logging, and if I decided that I wanted 
to see who looked at your record, I would know everybody who looked at your 
record.” 
“So anybody who goes in and looks at a record of same, the same last name 
that’s, that’s a flag.  It doesn’t mean it’s inappropriate.  It just means that we 
need to look at those a little bit closer.” 
“A system behind the scenes looking at these audit models that are being 
generated continuously and let’s look for patterns or let’s look for, let’s look for 
trends or patterns that you know doesn’t appear to be right and they need to be 
investigated on.” 
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Appendix E 
Illustrative Supporting Data for Organizational context 
2nd Order  
Themes 
Illustrative 1st Order Data 
Hospital Size  
“They [small hospitals] will be out of business and will not be compliant with 
HIPAA or HITECH, because they cannot afford to” 
“I have one (HIPAA officer) person to worry about 120 employees. If you had 
12,000 employees, to get that same ratio you’d have to have 100 HIPAA 
officers.” 
  
“I’m thinking of Hospital X and you’ve been in that hospital probably. I mean 
there’s so many points of access there, so many people and so many work 
stations and so much happening and paper everywhere.  It may be more of a 
challenge for them to adhere to the standards than here at this little hospital.” 
 
“I’d imagine in a big organization trying to control that is a daunting task so 
while we may not have the, the, the resources for the IT and the sophisticated 
systems and all that, from a HIPPA privacy standpoint we probably could do 
better than the big places.” 
“I think if you were a little hospital,  you couldn’t afford all these utilities.” 
Academic Status 
“We have a large teaching hospital which is actually in the heart of Columbus, 
Ohio.” 
 
“[We are] medical school and a major research institution.” 
 
“we have teaching hospitals” 
Educational 
Background 
“I have an undergraduate degree in computer science, and I also have a degree 
in history, and then i have my JD, jurist doctor, I am an attorney” 
 
“ I have an associate’s degree in biomedical engineering and a bachelor’s 
degree in electronic engineering and a master’s in business administration and 
business.” 
 
“I have a medical degree.” 
 
“I went to medical school and became an internist. I became convinced that we 
will never be able to provide high quality efficient care without using 
computers effectively … so started to get interested at the end of my residency 
and became one way and another involved [the hospital]  implementation of 
EHRs. ” 
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“I have a diploma in professional nursing, a bachelor’s of business and finance 
and a Master’s in organizational development.” 
 
Leadership 
“I think organizations really are a mirror who is leading them and I don’t think 
it’s any different on this subject [privacy] than it is on other key subjects 
whether it’s patient safety or anything else.” 
“Organizations that have great leadership at the top are generally proactive 
whether it’s HIPAA and privacy or electronics health records in general.  They 
are generally the trend setters and you have others that are the laggards that will 
comply, but they’ll do it in the 11
th
 hour on the last day.” 
“That is the type of organization, the type of leader [CEO] that will take the 
intent of something i.e. privacy, HIPAA, data security, and they will be trend 
setters, and will not negotiate on those points. So that’s you know it comes from 
the top. ” 
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Appendix F 
Empirical Grounding of the Study 
Evaluative 
Criteria 
Description Goal What to look for in this study 
Criterion 1 
Are concepts 
generated? 
 
Assess if the 
concepts used in 
the research are 
grounded in the 
data. 
The concepts used in the research 
are grounded in the data. 
Therefore, the study could be 
viewed as fitting with the first 
criterion. 
Criterion 2 
Are the concepts 
systematically 
related? 
Check if there is a 
linkage between 
concept 
The study shows how the concepts 
have been interwoven into more 
coherent themes and categories. 
Criterion 3 
Are there many 
conceptual 
linkages and are 
the categories 
well developed? 
Do they have 
conceptual 
density? 
Check if 
categories and 
subcategories are 
tightly linked. 
Open coding was followed by 
axial coding, which allowed dense 
categories to emerge. The linkage 
between categories was 
implemented and extension of 
those categories to themes and 
overarching dimensions was 
pursued to achieve conceptual 
density. 
Criterion 4 
Is much variation 
built into the 
theory? 
Check for 
variations in the 
theoretical model 
and different 
conditions and 
consequences. 
This research presents a hybrid of 
process and variance in the 
theoretical framework (Figure 4) 
that aims to depict the processes as 
a result of enacting privacy 
safeguards. The variance 
component derives from the 
organizational proactive approach 
which positively or negatively 
influences the outcomes. 
Criterion 5 
Are the broader 
conditions that 
affect the study 
built into its 
explanation? 
Incorporate the 
micro and macro 
conditions. 
This study incorporates micro 
conditions that were relevant to 
the study. The incorporation of the 
leadership commitment is a good 
example of integrating micro 
conditions. 
Criterion 6 
Has process been 
taken into 
Check if process 
has been 
This study focuses on 
understanding the outcomes of 
enacting privacy safeguards and 
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account? considered. their impact om privacy 
compliance.This translates into the 
processes undertaken to handle 
these outcomes. Therefore, the 
criterion of identifying process in 
research has been achieved. 
Criterion 7 
Do the theoretical 
findings seem 
significant and to 
what extent? 
 
Check for 
imagination and 
insights. 
 
The preliminary findings and a 
theoretical model have been 
published and well received (Parks 
et al., 2011a; Parks et al., 2011b); 
thus, I would regard this as 
evidence in support of their 
significance. 
Criterion 8 
Does the theory 
stand the test of 
time and become 
part of the 
discussions and 
ideas exchanged 
among relevant 
social and 
professional 
groups? 
Check if the 
theoretical 
framework is able 
to withstand 
future testing and 
research. 
Given that this study has been 
developed based on a specific 
context (i.e., healthcare), it is our 
hope that the insights of the 
emerging theory can make it 
withstand future applications and 
research. 
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Appendix G 
Research Process Evaluation Criteria  
Evaluative 
Criteria 
Description What to look for in this study 
Criterion 1 
How was the original sample 
selected? On what grounds? 
Interviewing informants has been 
initiated in the hospitals. However, 
after initial data analysis, this target 
was revisited to include other 
healthcare organizations and entities 
(e.g., the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, healthcare 
professional associations, healthcare 
IT providers, and healthcare privacy 
consultants). This sample was 
originally based on privacy leaders 
only in hospitals and ultimately 
included privacy leaders from other 
healthcare-organizations who impact 
the process by which hospitals 
respond to information privacy 
threats. 
Criterion 2 
What major categories emerged? The study led to the emergence of 
major categories – Enactment of 
Privacy safeguards, Negative 
Impacts, Positive Impacts, Imbalance 
Challenge, Workarounds, and 
Privacy Compliance. 
Criterion 3 
What were some of the events, 
incidents, or actions (indicators) 
that pointed to some of these 
categories? 
Categories emerged as a result of first 
and second order analysis. For 
example workarounds emerged when 
leaders mentioned their lack of 
compliance, and  when healthcare 
employees embraced activities to 
bypass privacy safeguards. 
Criterion 4 
On the basis of what categories did 
theoretical sampling proceed? That 
is, how did theoretical 
formulations guide some of the 
data collection? After the 
theoretical sampling was done, 
how representative did the 
Theoretical sampling was driven by 
the concepts that emerged. The 
categories of hospitals’ size, 
Workarounds and the Imbalance 
Challenge created a need to collect 
further data.  Ultimately, some 
categories sustained (e.g., 
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categories prove to be? 
 
Workarounds and the Imbalance 
Challenge) and others did not hold up 
(e.g., hospital size) 
Criterion 5 
What were some of the hypotheses 
pertaining to conceptual relations 
(i.e., among categories), and on 
what grounds were they 
formulated and validated? 
 
As a qualitative researcher, I came up 
with hypotheses in their initial form 
in early analysis. These hypotheses 
were formulated and based on the 
interpretations of the data collected. 
Examples of these hypotheses include 
proactive type organizations who 
exhibited very distinct behaviors 
regarding their approaches to 
responding to privacy threats, while 
reactive type organizations’ 
behaviors were opposite to the ones 
described above.  
 Criterion 6 
Were there instances in which 
hypotheses did not explain what 
was happening in the data? How 
were these discrepancies 
accounted for? Were hypotheses 
modified? 
 
As the coding continued, I improved 
categories and themes. Some did not 
hold up. For instance, at early stages 
of data analysis, I formulated the 
hypothesis that larger hospitals with 
more resources would thrive to 
achieve higher degree of privacy 
compliance and better address the 
imbalance issues. I further analyzed 
this pattern to discover that, while the 
hospital size matters because it is 
often closely linked with resources, it 
is the commitment of top managers 
that prevails. This hypothesis 
eventually was modified to account 
for the role of leadership 
commitment. 
Criterion 7 
How and why was the core 
category selected? Was this 
collection sudden or gradual, and 
was it difficult or easy? On what 
grounds were the final analytics 
decisions made? 
 
The Imbalance Challenge gradually 
emerged as the core theme of this 
study. While other categories 
emerged first, the Imbalance 
Challenge theme emerged as further 
analysis was undertaken. The final 
analytics decisions were made and 
validated with the empirical data. 
 
 
